Sądowa kontrola decyzji organów podatkowych w sprawach ulg w spłacie zobowiązań podatkowych opartych na uznaniu administracyjnym by Niezgoda, Andrzej




Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland
ORCID: 0000-0002-0664-2720
andrzej.niezgoda@umcs.pl
Judicial Review of Taxation Authorities’ Decisions 
on Reliefs in Payment of Tax Liabilities Based on 
Administrative Discretion
Sądowa kontrola decyzji organów podatkowych w sprawach 
ulg w spłacie zobowiązań podatkowych opartych na uznaniu 
administracyjnym
ABSTRACT
The article is of a scientific-research nature. The author discusses the problem of limits of judi-
cial review of discretionary decisions made by taxation authorities, which aim at applying relief in 
payments of tax liabilities under Polish regulations and case-law of administrative courts. It may be 
noted that despite the issue of administrative discretion being discussed in the academic literature, 
the question of limits of judicial review in the practice of administrative courts still raises doubts. It 
is therefore reasonable to undertake the analysis of the main views formulated in the literature and 
the case-law of administrative courts addressing this problem, from the point of view of the limits of 
judicial review of discretionary decisions. The thesis of the article is that the nature of discretionary 
decisions on relief in payment of tax liabilities, determined by the function of administrative discre-
tion, and, at the same time, the criteria set out in the law for judicial review of public administration, 
limit the role of the administrative court in examining the compliance with procedural law of the 
tax proceedings preceding the issuance of such a decision and the respecting by tax authorities of 
the fundamental values of the system of law expressed in the Polish Constitution. This is because 
they define the limits of administrative discretion, within which the choice of one of the possible 
solutions remains beyond the judicial review of the public administration. For the law, as it stands 
(de lege lata) there are no grounds for administrative courts, provided that the tax authorities respect 
the basic values of the legal system expressed in the Polish Constitution, to formulate assessments as 
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to the circumstances and reasons justifying the granting or refusal to grant a tax relief, or its scope. 
The concept of internal and external limits of administrative discretion may therefore be useful for 
administrative court rulings.
Keywords: discretionary decisions; limits of judicial review of discretionary decisions; taxation 
authorities; procedural law; administrative discretion
INTRODUCTION
The function of administrative judiciary, in accordance with Article 184 of 
the Polish Constitution,1 consists primarily in the review of public administration 
activity as regards compliance with law,2 i.e. both the compliance with formal law 
of the entire course of administrative proceedings and the correctness of the ap-
plication of substantive law.3 Therefore, when the court hearing an action against 
decisions made in administrative proceedings, as well as against acts or activities of 
public administration (referred to in Article 3 §§ 2 to 3 LPAC), evades the duty to 
perform the review in question or performs it using criteria other than compliance 
with the law, goes beyond the systemic framework of the operation of administra-
tive courts, violating Article 1 § 2 LSAC and Article 3 § 1 LPAC.4 In view of the 
above-mentioned provisions, the responsibility of administrative courts is solely 
the review of the challenged act in terms of compliance with law, but does not 
include examination in terms of purposefulness and rightness.5 An administrative 
1 Constitution of the Republic o Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 
483, as amended). English translation of the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/
kon1.htm [access: 8.07.2021].
2 As provided for in Article 1 §§ 1 and 2 of the Act of 25 July 2002 – Law on the System of 
Administrative Courts (Journal of Laws 2021, item 137), hereinafter: LSAC. As pointed out in the 
literature, this provision sets the systemic boundaries for the functioning of administrative courts. 
Cf. R. Hauser, A. Kabat, Właściwość sądów administracyjnych, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny” 2004, no. 2, p. 25.
3 Which results from the content of Article 145 § 1 of the Act of 30 August 2002 – Law on Procedure 
Before Administrative Courts (Journal of Laws 2019, item 2325, as amended), hereinafter: LPAC.
4 Cf. judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 December 2018, I FSK 1369 (un-
less specified otherwise, all the cited judgements of administrative courts are downloaded from the 
Central Database of Administrative Court Judgements). The regulations of the Law on the System 
of Administrative Courts and the Law on Procedure Before Administrative Courts mentioned above 
are the consequence of basing the political system of the Republic of Poland on the separation and 
balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers and on conferring upon the courts and 
tribunals only the judicial power. Legislative power is exercised by the Polish Sejm and the Senate, 
while the executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council 
of Ministers. See Article 19 of the Polish Constitution.
5 Cf. judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 January 2006, II OSK 630/05; 
judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 May 2018, II FSK 3783/17.
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court’s analysis of the purposefulness or rightness of the decision under review 
would mean encroaching on the powers of the relevant administrative authorities 
and interfering in their policies.6 For this reason, the adjudicatory powers of ad-
ministrative courts, arising from the content of Article 145 § 1 LPAC are generally 
of a cassation nature. Therefore, the courts may not rule on the merits of the case 
concerning the challenged act, but only uphold the challenged act or eliminate it 
from legal transactions if it is contrary to law.7
It is noted in the literature, however, that even within such limits of functioning, 
when reviewing the act being challenged, the court of first instance creates an idea 
of a defined, lawful decision as a benchmark to compare with the challenged act.8 
It is also pointed out that the problem of review of the legality of activities of the 
public administration by administrative courts, i.e. drawing the demarcation line 
between the exercise of executive and judicial powers raises many questions and 
doubts. One concept is that administrative courts taking decisions of a reformatory 
nature when certain conditions are met does not infringe the principle of separation 
of powers, as it is the duty of the court to remedy the infringement by the simplest 
means available.9 According to this concept, as a result of the amendment of the 
Law on Procedure Before Administrative Courts in 2015, Polish administrative 
courts were given the power to require the authority, where justified by the circum-
stances of the case, to issue a decision or order within a specified period, while also 
specifying the manner in which the case was to be settled or resolved.10
This problem was noticed in the literature with the appearance of judicial review 
of activity of the public administration. However, due to the changing paradigm 
of judicial review of the public administration, this problem is still valid and re-
quires more research. This paper aims to analyse the main theses put forward in the 
literature on the subject and the case-law of administrative courts addressing this 
problem, from the point of view of the limits of judicial review of discretionary 
decisions. The article does not address the issue of the relationship between the 
content of Articles 67a and 67b of the Tax Ordinance, which requires a separate 
study due to the divergence of views expressed in this regard in the case-law of 
the Polish Supreme Administrative Court.
6 Cf. judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 5 September 2019, I OSK 1419/18.
7 Cf. J.P. Tarno, Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi. Komentarz, Warszawa 
2006, p. 309.
8 Cf. T. Woś (ed.), H. Knysiak-Molczyk, M. Romańska, Ustawa o postępowaniu przed sądami 
administracyjnymi. Komentarz, Warszawa 2012, p. 724 and the literature referred to therein.
9 Cf. Z. Kmieciak, Zarys teorii postępowania administracyjnego, LEX/el. 2014.
10 See Article 145a § 1 LPAC, added by Article 1 (38) of the Act of 9 April 2015 amending 
the Act – Law on Procedure Before Administrative Courts (Journal of Laws 2015, item 658), as of 
15 August 2015.





ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND FLEXIBILITY OF OPERATION 
OF TAXATION AUTHORITIES
The legislation does not define administrative discretion. However, it can be 
assumed that administrative discretion, which ensures flexibility in the operation 
of public administration bodies and allows them to achieve economic, social and 
fiscal objectives, means the power to form a legal relationship according to the 
administrative authority’s own assessment of rightness or purpose, by choosing 
one of the alternative legal consequences of the facts established. Discretion is 
therefore part of the legal norm and occurs at the last stage of the application of law.
The flexibility of operation of public administration resulting from a certain 
margin of discretion in applying the law is manifested at almost all stages of the 
application of law. A validation decision has a strict (non-discretionary) norm. 
However, the law-applying public administration body has a certain scope of free-
dom in making an interpretative decision, depending on the adopted concept of 
interpretation. Generally speaking, the static theory of legal interpretation, which 
assumes the primacy of the linguistic method, leaves less freedom than the dynamic 
theory, which opens up to functional and teleological methods of interpretation. At 
the stage of establishing facts of the case, the lack of being bound by rigid rules, 
though not arbitrariness, results from the principle of free assessment of evidence.11 
At the stage of legal assessment of the established facts, the freedom of decision 
may result from the intended ambiguity of the legal norm designed as such by 
the lawmakers through the use of general clauses or estimative expressions, as in 
Article 67a of the Tax Ordinance,12 “public interest” and “important interest of the 
taxpayer”, the meaning of which is explained in the context of a specific factual 
state. Their use allows the achievement of various taxation objectives, while re-
specting the principle of exclusivity of statutory provisions in the field of imposing 
and shaping the structure of public levies, by ensuring the necessary flexibility of 
legal regulation.13
The main purpose of the use of discretion is to enable public administration 
bodies to issue decisions taking into account different reasons and values,14 and 
11 Cf. A. Hanusz, Podstawa faktyczna decyzji podatkowej a swobodna ocena dowodów, [in:] Pro 
publico bono. Regulacje prawno-podatkowe i rozwiązania finansowe. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora 
Jana Głuchowskiego, Toruń 2002, p. 95; L. Leszczyński, Open Axiology in Judical Interpretation of 
Law and Possible Misuseof Discretion, “Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2020, vol. 29(3), p. 43.
12 Act of 29 August 1997 – Tax Ordinance (Journal of Laws 2020, item 1235, as amended).
13 Cf. P. Borszowski, Określenia nieostre i klauzule generalne w prawie podatkowym, Warszawa 
2017, p. 140.
14 G. Pesce, Discretionary Power of Public Administration and Control of Public Debt: The 
Citizen and the Judge between the Law and the Precedent, “Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2020, 
vol. 29(3), p. 117.
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consequently, as mentioned above, flexibility of operation. Legal norms which 
contain a reference to administrative discretion are opposite to strict norms binding 
in a given decision. Strict norms do not leave public administration bodies, at the 
stage of establishing legal consequences of the factual state, any margin of discre-
tion in adopting administrative acts, depriving them of the possibility to choose 
a specific rule of proceeding on their own.
Undoubtedly, the review of discretionary decisions by the administrative court 
proves to be difficult. Apart from the above-mentioned issue, directly related to the 
scope of adherence by the court to its responsibilities, i.e. the exercise of review of 
decisions made by public administration only according to the criterion of compli-
ance with law, it should be noted that the court may not have enough knowledge 
needed to assess the reviewed decision from the point of view of rightness or pur-
posefulness. which may not be apparent from the case file.15 As regards decisions 
of taxation authorities of local government units based on administrative discretion, 
it should also be noted that making such decisions is a manifestation of the imple-
mentation of an independent social, economic or fiscal policy by local government 
units.16 Pursuant to Article 165 (2) of the Polish Constitution, independence of local 
government is subject to judicial protection. Therefore, the administrative court 
should not narrow it down by applying criteria other than compliance with the law, 
to assess discretionary decisions on local government tax relief. During the Second 
Polish Republic, the legislature eliminated these difficulties, expressly excluding 
from the competence of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal any cases in which 
administrative bodies were entitled to decide at their discretion, within the margin 
left to this discretion.17
The nature of discretionary decisions concerning the application of tax relief in 
the payment of tax liabilities determined by the function of administrative discretion 
and at the same time the statutorily defined criteria for judicial review of the public 
administration raise a question as to the scope of judicial review of decisions of this 
type. It seems justified to claim that the role of the administrative court is limited 
to examining the compatibility of the tax proceeding with procedural law and the 
respecting by the tax authorities of the fundamental values of the system of law, as 
expressed in the Polish Constitution. This is because they outline the framework of 
15 For example, related to collecting revenues as a source of financing public tasks which is 
a basis for developing directives for the fiscal policy.
16 One of guarantees of this independence of local government is the limitation of powers of 
the local government board of appeal, resulting from Article 233 § 3 of the Tax Ordinance, which 
board of appeal, when accepting an appeal against a decision of the local government tax authority, 
may only issue a cassation decision.
17 See Article 6 (2) of the Regulation of 27 October 1932 on the Supreme Administrative Tribunal 
(Journal of Laws 1932, no. 94, item 806).





administrative discretion, within which the choice of one of the possible solutions 
remains beyond the judicial review of the public administration.
The understanding of the concept of discretion in the science of administrative 
law has evolved.18 This also concerned the question of the scope of freedom and 
binding those authorities with law. Initially, in the perspective of naturalistic con-
cepts, it was assumed that discretion existed outside the realm of legal regulation, 
which was relatively narrow at that time. It used to be claimed that the public ad-
ministration could generally operate freely unless its activities had been regulated 
to a certain extent by law.19 It was also pointed out that the public administration 
was not, by its very nature, limited to the execution of laws, since it was established 
to act creatively, outside the scope of the statutory provisions.20 The administrative 
body may therefore also take a decision where the law is silent, provided that this 
does not prejudice the public interest or interest of the individual.21
On the other hand, in the perspective of positivistic concepts, discretion needs 
a statutory authorisation, a kind of “power of attorney” from the legislature. How-
ever, using the discretion granted by the law, the authority operates in a legally 
unregulated area. Therefore discretion, which is a specific type of authorisation 
under the administrative law,22 consists of the possibility for a public authority to 
act on its own, but within statutory limits.23
The essence of modern views on administrative discretion is the assumption 
that every intervention of the public administration in the individual sphere of 
the citizen must have a clear, specific, statutory basis24 and that the actions of the 
administration must remain within the limits of the law. Where legal norms do not 
expressly provide for the competence of a public authority, that competence cannot 
be presumed.25 This is expressed in Article 7 of the Polish Constitution, according 
to which the organs of public authority function on the basis of, and within the 
limits of, the law. This provision sets the absolute limits beyond which there is 
lawlessness.26 Thus, there is only such discretion and only within such limits as the 
legislature may prescribe in a given case. Discretion is therefore a strictly defined 
18 Cf. M. Mincer, Uznanie administracyjne, Toruń 1983, p. 8 ff.
19 J. Starościak, Swobodne uznanie władz administracyjnych, Warszawa 1948, p. 89.
20 W.L. Jaworski, Nauka prawa administracyjnego. Zagadnienia ogólne, Warszawa 1924, 
pp. 123–126.
21 J.S. Langrod, Zagadnienia wybrane z praktyki administracyjnej, Kraków 1938, pp. 91–93.
22 W. Reiss, Prawo administracyjne w zarysie, part 1: Nauka administracji, Toruń 1946, p. 114, 126.
23 S. Kasznica, Polskie prawo administracyjne. Pojęcia i instytucje zasadnicze, Poznań 1947, 
pp. 133–134.
24 M. Zimmermann, Pojęcie administracji publicznej a swobodne uznanie, Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 13–14.
25 Cf. judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 10 May 1994, W 7/94, OTK 1994, no. 1, item 23.
26 R. Gałęski, Zakres swobody organu administracji publicznej w podejmowaniu czynności 
faktycznych, “Przegląd Prawa i Administracji” 2002, no. 51, p. 192.
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area of freedom granted to the public administration by the legislature, but does not 
imply the right to any arbitrary action.27 The authorisation for administrative discre-
tion is a specific and unique way of shaping the competence of a public authority in 
the content of a legal norm.28 It consists of the possibility for the public authority 
to choose one of several equivalent legal consequences of a given factual situation.
In a legal norm, that authorisation to choose the legal consequences of the facts 
established is contained in its part referred to as disposition of the norm.29 The 
part referred to as the hypothesis defines in addition to the addressee of the norm, 
the circumstances in which it applies, while the disposition delimits the scope of 
regulation, that is the required or prohibited conduct. This part of the legal nor 
therefore gives the public administration body the option to choose between two 
or more legal consequences.30 It may also be noted that the authorisation for discre-
tion, but expressed in the hypothesis of a legal norm, occurs when the hypothesis 
of the norm is imprecise or absent.31 An example of a norm with such structure 
may be the norm resulting from the content of Article 18 of the Polish Citizenship 
Act,32 pursuant to which the President of the Republic of Poland may grant Polish 
citizenship to a foreigner.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that Article 67a § 1 of the Tax Ordinance is 
structured differently. It is possible to decode from this provision a norm, which re-
quires the taxation authorities to grant at the request of a taxpayer a tax relief in cases 
justified by an important interest of the taxpayer or the public interest (hypothesis), 
i.e. to defer the date of tax payment or spread the payment of tax into instalments, 
to defer or spread into instalments the payment of tax arrears with interest for late 
payment or interest on outstanding tax advances, to cancel, in whole or in part, tax 
arrears, interest for late payment or prolongation fee or to refuse to grant the relief 
(disposition). In this case, discretion entails determining the legal consequences of 
the factual state and consists in the possibility for the tax authority to choose one 
of several legally equivalent consequences of this factual state. Such position of 
administrative discretion in the structure of the legal norm constituting the basis 
for granting tax reliefs was supported by the Supreme Administrative Court when 
27 Z. Janowicz, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. Komentarz, Warszawa 1999, p. 305.
28 A. Nałęcz, Uznanie administracyjne a reglamentacja działalności gospodarczej, Warszawa 
2010, p. 35.
29 T. Bigo, Kontrola uznania administracyjnego, “Sprawozdania Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa 
Naukowego” 1959, no. 14A, p. 55; M. Mincer, op. cit., p. 52.
30 A. Nałęcz, op. cit., p. 41 and the literature referred to therein, including I. Bogucka, Państwo 
prawne a problem uznania administracyjnego, “Państwo i Prawo” 1991, no. 14, p. 40 and M. Mincer, 
op. cit., p. 52 ff.
31 W. Lang, A. Delorme, Z zagadnień tzw. swobodnego uznania (w związku z wprowadzeniem 
sądowej kontroli administracji), “Państwo i Prawo” 1957, no. 4–5, p. 747.
32 Act of 2 April 2009 on Polish citizenship (Journal of Laws 2020, item 347).





it stated that the expressions “important interest of the taxpayer” and “the public 
interest”, referring to the hypothesis of the norm, point to the factual situation in 
which tax arrears or default interest may be forgiven. The taxation authority has 
a certain margin of freedom in both the interpretation of those terms and the assess-
ment of the factual situation. This freedom in respect of the interpretation of vague 
terms and assessment of the factual situation cannot be equated with administrative 
discretion. Discretion, i.e. the application of the disposition of a legal norm, takes 
place when the taxation authority finds that there is one of these prerequisites or 
both of them jointly.33 On the other hand, if the authority finds the prerequisites of 
“important interest of the taxpayer” or “public interest” non-existent, the authority 
will not have an option to choose and the decision will be of a strict nature.34
This way of approach to Article 67a § 1 of the Tax Ordinance determines two 
phases of tax proceedings. In the first phase, the taxation authority must determine 
whether at least one of the prerequisites for the application of relief (“important 
interest of the taxpayer”, “public interest”) exists, which requires gathering evidence 
necessary for these findings, and its proper evaluation. If it is established that one 
or both of the prerequisites are fulfilled, the proceedings move to the second phase 
in which the taxation authority, exercising its administrative discretion, chooses 
whether to grant or refuse the relief. Thus, if the authority finds and assesses that an 
important interest of the taxpayer or the public interest does not exist in the given 
case, it will not be entitled to apply tax relief.35
LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS
With the development of the positivist concept of administrative discretion, 
which assumes that discretion requires a detailed legal basis, a reflection was also 
undertaken on the limits of discretion and judicial review of discretionary activities 
of the public administration. The external and internal boundaries of discretion were 
then distinguished. External boundaries are delimited by law. Internal boundaries 
are non-legal and are related to motivation of the authority concerned.36 At the same 
time, it was assumed that only the infringement of external boundaries had legal 
relevance. The administrative court is therefore entitled only to examine whether 
the authority has exceeded the external limits of its discretion or not. On the other 
33 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 August 2010, II FSK 689/09.
34 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 March 2006, II FSK 493/05.
35 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 May 2018, II FSK 1431/16.
36 T. Hilarowicz, Najwyższy Trybunał Administracyjny i jego kompetencja, Warszawa 1925, 
pp. 230–231; J. Starościak, op. cit., p. 92 ff.
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hand, the question of respecting internal boundaries falls outside the scope of judi-
cial review. This concept is based on the above-mentioned regulation of the scope 
of review of activity of the public administration by the Supreme Administrative 
Tribunal, which excludes judicial review of the operation of the administrative 
authorities within the limits left to discretion.
After the reinstatement of administrative jurisdiction in Poland, the Supreme 
Administrative Court did not take up the concepts of external and internal bound-
aries of discretion. Instead, in the judgement of June 1981, th Court took the view 
that the authority which takes a discretionary decision is limited in the choice of 
legal consequences by the general principle of taking into account the public inter-
est and the legitimate interest of the citizens. The authority is therefore obliged to 
settle the case positively or the party if this does not contradict the public interest 
and does not exceed the possibilities of the authority to exercise the powers poten-
tially conferred.37 That view was an expressis verbis reproduction of the content 
of Article 7 of the Code of Administrative Procedure,38 in the wording given to it 
a few months earlier.39 This ruling, by indicating the criteria to be followed by the 
public authority when deciding within the external boundaries of its discretion or, 
in other words, assuming that those criteria are of a normative nature, gave rise 
to judicial review of the conditions for the public administration to choose from 
among various consequences of the factual state specified by the legal norm.40 
It also states that the criteria for the selection of legal consequences may be laid 
down in provisions other than those of substantive law, which form the basis for 
action of the public authority and which include the authorisation for administrative 
discretion. According to the view proposed in that judgement, the concretisation of 
a norm containing an authorisation for administrative discretion may be lawfully 
assessed in a given factual state in the light of a proper interpretation of the terms 
37 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 June 1981, SA 820/81, ONSA 1981, 
no. 1, item 57.
38 Act of 14 June 1960 – Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 2021, item 735).
39 By Article 11 of the Act of 31 January 1980 on the Supreme Administrative Court and on the 
amendment of the Act Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 1980, no. 4, item 8), as 
of 1 September 1980.
40 It should be noted that Article 122 of the Tax Ordinance, which is the “equivalent” of the 
aforementioned Article of the Code of Administrative Procedure, does not formulate a general rule to 
be guided, when hearing each tax case, by the values resulting from the indicated or similar general 
clauses. Given the systemic and economic sense of taxation (tax is an individual sacrifice for a col-
lective purpose) the taxation authority should take into account the public interest and the legitimate 
interest of the taxpayer when making tax-law decisions. This is a political-systemic duty. Moreover, 
as further discussed, in the legal regulation forming a basis for granting tax relief using administrative 
discretion, those clauses constitute, as an element of the hypothesis of a legal norm, the basis for the 
legal assessment of the facts and not the directive on the choice of the consequences in the form of 
the grant or refusal of the tax relief.





“public interest” and “legitimate interest of the citizen” in only one way. Other 
potential possible choices, in the light of the provision which is the direct basis for 
the activity of the administrative authority, will be unlawful.
In the literature, however, an opinion was presented that even when the dis-
position of the norm entitles to using discretion, the hypothesis may contain the 
indication of such factual circumstances that the authority will not be able to choose 
the legal consequence, but its decision will be of a strict nature. The circumstances 
indicated in the hypothesis will in fact constitute directives for the choice of le-
gal consequences.41 Deeming the prerequisites of the public interest or important 
interest of the taxpayer as directives for the choice of legal consequences is also 
present in the case law.42 Such a view does not seem accurate with regard to dis-
cretionary decisions on tax reliefs. This follows from the above-quoted wording 
of the provision of Article 67a § 1 of the Tax Ordinance, which formulates the 
basis for discretionary decisions on granting tax reliefs. Indeed, if one were to 
share the argumentation presented above that the circumstances indicated in the 
hypothesis constitute directives for the choice of legal consequences and, therefore, 
the decision of the taxation authority on the application of the relief would be of 
a strict nature, then one would have to assume that the phrase: “the tax authority 
… in cases justified by the public interest or an important interest of the tax- 
payer, may defer/spread into instalments/cancel …” is equivalent to the phrase: “in 
cases justified by the public interest or by the important interest of the taxpayer, 
the authority shall defer/spread into instalments/cancel …”. However, neither the 
rules of colloquial language nor the contents of the Tax Ordinance do not authorise 
this. Also in the literature on the subject, both older and current, it is indicated that 
one form of authorisation to discretion is the use of the phrase in the legal text: 
“the authority may” take a decision of a certain content.43 This understanding of 
the formula contained in Article 67a of the Tax Ordinance was presented by the 
Supreme Administrative Court which assumed that a public administration body, 
after a comprehensive examination of the facts and finding that at least one of the 
prerequisites included in the hypothesis of the norm, i.e. that the public interest 
or an important interest of the taxpayer justifies the application of the tax relief, 
may either issue a positive decision for the party or refuse to grant such relief.44 
On the other hand, if the taxation authority finds the prerequisites of “important 
interest of the taxpayer” or “public interest” non-existent in the application of the 
41 A. Habuda, Granice uznania administracyjnego, Opole 2004, p. 65 ff.
42 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 15 March 2013, II FSK 1535/11; judgement 
of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 June 2019, II FSK 2414/17.
43 M. Jaroszyński, M. Zimmermann, W. Brzeziński, Polskie prawo administracyjne. Część ogólna, 
Warszawa 1956, p. 359; J. Borkowski, Decyzja administracyjna, Łódź–Zielona Góra 1998, p. 80.
44 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 31 January 2006, I FSK 570/03; judgement 
of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 October 2009, I FSK 804/08.
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tax relief, the authority will not have an option to choose and the decision will be 
of a strict nature.45
It should be accepted that for that very reason general clauses or phrases de-
fining compliance with the norm formulated in the hypothesis of the norm, which 
determine its scope of application, constitute a restriction on the freedom of action 
of the body applying the legal norm containing the authorisation to discretion. It 
should be stressed, however, that they equally restrict the body applying a norm 
that does not include authorisation for discretion. This is due to the function of 
hypothesis of the legal norm. It defines, as mentioned earlier, the class of conduct 
(situation) in which the norm applies. Such a restriction cannot, therefore, be re-
garded as typical of discretionary decisions or as a directive for the discretionary 
choice of legal consequences.
In view of the above-mentioned understanding of administrative discretion, 
which consists in the possibility for a public authority to choose one of the legally 
equivalent consequences of a given factual situation, and disregarding what is linked 
to the application of law in general and not specific to discretion but also applies 
to discretionary decisions, it must be concluded that there are two types of limits 
of discretion.46 First, the limits of discretion determine the consequences of facts 
described in the disposition of a legal norm. As part of discretion, the authority 
may only choose between the legal consequences laid down by law and not any 
consequences. Referring this to the provisions authorizing discretionary decisions 
in matters of tax credits, two legal consequences can be observed in establishing 
that the granting of the tax relief is justified by the public interest or an important 
interest of the taxpayer. In such a situation, the authority may either grant or re-
fuse the relief. Moreover, the limits of discretion are set by the taxpayer’s request 
indicating the type of relief sought by the taxpayer.
Secondly, the limits of discretion define the circumstances which the authority is 
required to take into account when choosing one of the several legal consequences 
referred to in the disposition of the legal norms, namely the directive on the choice 
of consequences. These are the values or objectives that the body should be guided 
by when choosing the legal consequences. They may be articulated in the wording 
of the provision containing an authorisation for discretion or not.47
Article 67a of the Tax Ordinance, which includes the authorisation for discretion 
in deciding on the granting of tax reliefs, does not formulate directives for the selec-
45 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 March 2006, II FSK 493/05.
46 A. Nałęcz, op. cit., p. 80 ff.
47 This is the case, e.g., in Article 18c §§ 1 and 2 of the Tax Ordinance, pointing to the objective 
of streamlining and speeding up tax audit or tax proceedings, as a directive for the choice of conse-
quences in the form of the designation or non-designation of a single taxation authority as competent 
to carry out the audit or proceedings in cases concerning taxpayers located within the jurisdiction of 
different authorities.





tion of consequences. However, the literature has presented the view that directives 
for the selection of legal consequences may result from the Polish Constitution as 
well as from procedural rules.48 The Supreme Administrative Court also took the 
position that the decision concerning the tax relief cannot be arbitrary. According 
to Article 7 of the Polish Constitution and Article 120 of the Tax Ordinance, public 
authorities are obliged to act on the basis of law and within the limits of law. In the 
case of administrative discretion, the absence of clear legal rules determining the 
outcome does not mean that the decision of the authority may be abstracted from 
any legal criteria. Considerations of rightness and purposefulness in choosing the 
decision option must, in parallel, take into account the need for the authority to 
implement constitutional values and norms.49
Administrative courts, when reviewing decisions of taxation authorities in 
cases of reliefs based on administrative discretion, have often taken a position as 
to in what circumstances, for what reasons and to what extent the granting of re-
lief would be justified, invoking the need to avoid the undesirable, from the social 
and individual points of view, effects of tax enforcement,50 exceptional nature of 
tax cancellation redemption as an inefficient form of expiry of tax liabilities,51 or 
finally the current financial and medical situation of the taxpayer.52 This current 
also includes judgements in which the court indicates that the authority should 
determine in each case what is more important from the point of view of the public 
48 A. Błaś, Studia z nauki prawa administracyjnego i nauki administracji, “Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis. Prawo” 1988, vol. 21, p. 47. In this context, it is worth noting the content of Ar-
ticle 8 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (in the wording effective since 1 June 2017), 
according to which public administration bodies shall conduct proceedings in a manner that inspires 
confidence of its participants in public authority, being guided by the principles of proportionality, 
impartiality and equal treatment. However, the literature, when commenting on the provision, points 
out that following the principles of proportionality, impartiality and equal treatment is a procedural 
obligation of any public administration body. This is indicated by the wording of the commented 
provision, which requires that these principles are followed in the course of “running” administrative 
proceedings by public administration bodies. It is, therefore, doubtful that the said principles have the 
character of directives for the interpretation and application of substantive law constituting the legal 
basis for resolving an administrative case. See A. Wróbel, [in:] M. Jaśkowska, M. Wilbrandt-Gotowicz, 
A. Wróbel, Komentarz aktualizowany do ustawy z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. – Kodeks postępowania 
administracyjnego, LEX/el 2019, thesis 11 of the commentary on Article 8. As a side note, it may be 
pointed out that Article 121 § 1 of the Tax Ordinance does not contain a similar reference.
49 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 October 2017, II FSK 2422/15.
50 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 June 2019, II FSK 2414/17.
51 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 15 March 2013, II FSK 1535/11; judgement 
of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 June 2019, II FSK 2414/17.
52 Non-final judgement of the Voivodeship Supreme Administrative Court in Rzeszów of 2 July 
2019, I SA/Rz 244/19.
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interest: granting or refusing to grant the relief, by weighing the values common 
to the whole society, such as fairness, ethical principles, trust in state authorities.53
Sometimes the administrative court did not positively formulate directives on 
the choice of legal consequences to be followed by the taxation authority when 
making decisions based on administrative discretion, but only pointed out that 
a choice made in gross violation of the principle of fairness would be unaccept-
able, as a result of taking into account obviously irrelevant (trivial) or irrational 
criteria, as well as on the basis of false premises (arguments that are not true). The 
court has also stressed that the cases of using this power by the tax authorities in 
an arbitrary, completely irrational manner, or contrary to basic constitutional prin-
ciples, must not remain outside judicial review.54 Admittedly, if the conditions are 
met, the public administration body has the right, but not the obligation, to grant 
the relief. However, the decision of the body cannot be arbitrary, but must be the 
result of finding the facts of the case, a comprehensive collection and exhaustive 
consideration of the evidence material.55
One should also note rulings in which the Supreme Administrative Court stated 
that, once one of the conditions had been found to exist, it was for the tax admin-
istration body56 to choose the decision, and that the finding that the decision was 
not arbitrary, because it was based on the evidence gathered and its assessment, 
precluded interference by the court with the free choice made by the taxation au-
thority.57 It is not the administrative discretion as such that is subject to review, but 
the question of whether the decision was taken in accordance with the basic rules 
of administrative procedure and especially whether it was based on the evidence 
gathered in the case and whether the assessment of that evidence was carried out 
in accordance with the principle of the free assessment of evidence or whether it 
contained elements of arbitrariness. This means that even the authority finds all the 
prerequisites does not obligate it to grant the relief, but only gives the option to do 
so and to a limited extent that it is subject to judicial review.58
53 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 27 February 2013, II FSK 1351/11; 
judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 May 2017, II GSK 5349/16.
54 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 May 2018, II FSK 1431/16.
55 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 November 2007, II FSK 1353/06; 
judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 June 2011, II FSK 227/10; judgement of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of 17 May 2017, II GSK 5349/16.
56 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 31 January 2006, I FSK 570/03; judgement 
of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 October 2009, I FSK 804/08.
57 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 7 February 2001, I SA/Gd 1507/00.
58 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 7 February 2018, II FSK 3609/15. This 
judgement was issued in a case of exemption from enforcement against the assets of the person li- 
able, pursuant to Article 13 § 1 of the Act of 17 June 1966 on enforcement proceedings in the public 
administration (Journal of Laws 2020, item 1427, as amended), which is structured similarly to 
Article 67a of the Tax Ordinance.





It may be pointed out that in some European countries, the criteria for judicial 
review of decisions based on administrative discretion are generally laid down 
in the legal acts governing administrative proceedings. For example, the German 
Act on administrative judiciary of 1960 authorises the court to verify whether the 
administrative act under review falls within its statutory limits and whether the 
discretion was in a manner appropriate to the purpose of the authorisation. The Es-
tonian Code of Procedure before Administrative Courts of 1999 obligates the court 
to assess, when examining the legality of an act of discretion, whether that act was 
adopted within the limits and in accordance with the purpose of the discretion and 
in accordance with the principles of proportionality, equality and other generally 
accepted principles of law.59 These criteria are similar to those specified in the case 
law of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court.
CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, it should be stated that in the content of the analysed legal regulation 
which governs the granting of tax reliefs, discretion occurs in the disposition of the 
norm and takes place at the stage of determining the legal consequences of facts of 
the case, when the authority selects one of the legally equivalent consequences of 
the established factual state. The authorisation resulting from the provisions of the 
Act to make decisions on tax reliefs with the application of discretion gives the tax 
authorities a space within which they implement economic, social or fiscal policies, 
which is within the scope of the executive authority’s activities. The legislature, by 
granting tax authorities the power to decide on reliefs with the use of administrative 
discretion, did not expressly formulate directives on the choice of legal consequenc-
es. Clauses of public interest and important interest of the taxpayer, included in 
the hypothesis of the norm, which are the criteria for assessing the factual state, do 
not constitute such directives. Determining that the facts constitute a case justified 
by an important interest of the taxpayer or the public interest, obliges the taxation 
authority to consider whether to grant a relief or refuse it. Otherwise, the decision 
to refuse to grant the tax relief is of a strict nature.
The fact that the provision of the Tax Ordinance does not set out the criteria 
for selecting legal consequences does not mean that within the limits of the space 
left to the taxation authorities by applying administrative discretion, they may 
decide arbitrarily. It is aptly pointed out in the case-law of the Supreme Adminis-
59 S. Łajszczak, Rozwój procedur administracyjnych na tle standardów funkcjonowania władzy 
publicznej, [in:] Kierunki rozwoju prawa administracyjnego. Prace członków i Przyjaciół na 5-lecie 
Koła Naukowego Prawa Administracyjnego na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, ed. R. Stankiewicz, 
Warszawa 2011, p. 106 ff.
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trative Court that decisions made by tax authorities with the use of administrative 
discretion in matters of tax relief, apart from teleological reasons resulting from 
the policy pursued, must also take into account the necessity to implement consti-
tutional values and norms. For the law as it stands (de lege lata), however, it does 
not seem justified to derive directives on the choice of legal consequences from 
procedural provisions.
Due to the functions of administrative judiciary, the review of decisions of 
taxation authorities in cases of reliefs granted based on administrative discretion by 
administrative courts, covers only the examination of the compliance with proce-
dural law, which should lead to a thorough clarification of the facts and formulation 
of its correct assessment from the point of view of public interest and important 
interest of the taxpayer. De lege lata, there are no grounds for administrative courts, 
provided that the taxation authorities respect the basic values of the legal system 
expressed in the Constitution, to formulate assessments as to the circumstances and 
reasons justifying the granting or refusal to grant a tax relief, or the scope of relief.
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ABSTRAKT
Artykuł ma charakter naukowo-badawczy. Autor, w oparciu o polskie regulacje prawne i orzecz-
nictwo sądów administracyjnych, analizuje problem granic sądowej kontroli podejmowanych przez 
organy podatkowe decyzji uznaniowych mających za przedmiot zastosowanie ulg w spłacie zobo-
wiązań podatkowych. Można zauważyć, że – mimo podejmowania problematyki uznania administra-
cyjnego w piśmiennictwie naukowym – zagadnienie granic sądowej kontroli w praktyce orzeczniczej 
sądów administracyjnych ciągle budzi wątpliwości. Zasadnie jest zatem, co jest celem niniejsze-
go opracowania, przeprowadzenie analizy głównych poglądów formułowanych w piśmiennictwie 
i w orzecznictwie sądowoadministracyjnym w odniesieniu do tego problemu, z punktu widzenia 
granic sądowej kontroli decyzji uznaniowych. Tezą artykułu jest założenie, że determinowany funk-
cją uznania administracyjnego charakter decyzji uznaniowych mających za przedmiot zastosowanie 
ulg w spłacie zobowiązań podatkowych, a także zakreślone ustawowo kryteria sądowej kontroli 
administracji publicznej ograniczają rolę sądu administracyjnego do zbadania zgodności z prawem 
procesowym samego postępowania podatkowego poprzedzającego wydanie takiej decyzji oraz do 
respektowania przez organy podatkowe podstawowych wartości systemu prawa, wyrażonych w Kon-
stytucji RP. Wyznaczają one bowiem granice uznania administracyjnego, wewnątrz których wybór 
jednego z możliwych rozstrzygnięć pozostaje poza sądową kontrolą administracji. De lega lata nie 
ma podstaw do tego, aby sądy administracyjne, z zastrzeżeniem respektowania przez organy podat-
kowe podstawowych wartości systemu prawa, wyrażonych w Konstytucji RP, formułowały oceny 
co do okoliczności i przyczyn uzasadniających udzielenie albo odmowę udzielenia ulgi podatkowej 
bądź jej zakresu. Dla orzecznictwa sądowoadministracyjnego przydatna może być zatem koncepcja 
wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych granic uznania administracyjnego.
Słowa kluczowe: decyzje uznaniowe; granice sądowej kontroli decyzji uznaniowych; organy 
podatkowe; prawo procesowe; uznanie administracyjne
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